Gender and Sexuality in Critical Animal Studies explores nonhuman animals' experiences of gender, physiological sex, and sexuality while in nature and captivity. Each chapter applies disciplines like literary theory, disability studies, queer studies, ecocriticism, and more to investigate media that shape perceptions and treatment of nonhumans.

By promoting total liberation, this volume challenges the reader to think about new approaches to justice, equity, diversity, and inclusion. The contributors examine and disrupt many of the exclusionary assumptions and behaviors by those working toward justice and liberation, encouraging the reader to reflect on their own thoughts and actions.

Intersectionality of Critical Animal Studies: A Historical Collection represents the very best that the Journal for Critical Animal Studies (JCAS) has published in terms of articles that are written by activists and for activists.

Expanding the Critical Animal Studies Imagination: Essays in Solidarity and Total Liberation pushes critical animal studies forward and outward by making new connections to movements and ideas that have been little engaged with in publication to the present. This book challenges critical animal studies adherents to expand their efforts of solidarity, mutual aid, and activism. Contributors to this volume extend invitations to those not familiar with critical animal studies to welcome them in with gestures of solidarity towards total liberation. Expanding (...) the Critical Animal Studies Imagination does not shy away from controversial topics but critically engages with them using care and tact. This is not controversy for the sake of being provocative, but not being afraid to target root causes of oppression. This book works toward coalition building to resist the current violence and build peaceful communities. (shrink)

At the End of the World there is blackness doing the (im)possible. This essay considers the (im)possibility of debate in our contemporary crisis through an examination of the domestication of potentiality in rhetorical dialectic. Debate, in its presupposition of stasis, parallels sovereignty's ontologizing operations of antiblack racial terror that suspend contingency. Meanwhile, blackness was already getting it done. The U.S. Civil War serves as a privileged example for thinking through blackness as the groundless constitutive outside to the possible that yet (...) gestures toward other generative moments found in refusal of the disappointing options that pass for politics offered to us today. (shrink)

In this essay I ask the reader to consider the “end of life” as a life stage, rather than as a health state. At one end of the life course is childhood and at the other end is elderhood. The basic inter-generational social compact in most societies is that working adults take care of their children and their parents, and count on their children to do the same for them. In developed countries, these obligations are met in part through government (...) programs, with taxpayers funding significant portions of education, health care, and income support. (shrink)

This book is designed to make the various hardships encountered by many students more personal in order to give teachers insight into the very real needs of today’s students.

Abstract. We argue that all human beings have a special type of dignity which is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well-being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings are equal in fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of (...) their possession of certain characteristics in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self-consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 51-53.

Background: Relatively little is known about neonatologists' roles in helping families navigate the difficult decision to attempt or withhold resuscitation for a neonate delivering at the threshold...

Education for Total Liberation is a collection of essays from leaders in the field of critical animal pedagogy (CAP). CAP emerges from activist educators teaching critical animal studies and is rooted in critical theory as well as the animal advocacy movement. Critical animal studies (CAS) argues for an interdisciplinary approach to understanding our relationships with nonhuman animals. CAS challenges two specific fields of theory: (1) animal studies, rooted in vivisection and testing on animals in the hard sciences and (2) human-animal (...) studies, which reinforces a socially constructed binary between humans and animals and adopts abstract theoretical approaches. In contrast, CAS takes a progressive and committed approach to scholarship and sees the exploitation of nonhuman animals as interrelated with oppression of humans based on class, gender, race, ability, sexuality, age, and citizenship. CAS promotes the liberation of all animals and challenges all systems of domination. Education for Total Liberation is appropriate for undergraduate and graduate level readers (and beyond) who wish to learn from examples of radical pedagogical projects shaped by CAS and critical pedagogy. Contributing to this collection are Anne C. Bell, Anita de Melo, Carolyn Drew, Amber E. George, Karin Gunnarsson Dinker, Sinem Ketenci, John Lupinacci, Anthony J. Nocella II, Sean Parson, Helena Pedersen, Ian Purdy, Constance L. Russell, J.L. Schatz, Meneka Repka, William E. Shanahan III, and Richard J, White. (shrink)

"Its publication should be a major event for cognitive linguistics and should pose a major challenge for cognitive science. In addition, it should have repercussions in a variety of disciplines, ranging from anthropology and psychology to epistemology and the philosophy of science.... Lakoff asks: What do categories of language and thought reveal about the human mind? Offering both general theory and minute details, Lakoff shows that categories reveal a great deal."—David E. Leary, American Scientist.

Academic dishonesty, including cheating and plagiarism, is on the rise in colleges, particularly among engineering students. While students decide to engage in these behaviors for many different reasons, academic integrity training can help improve their understanding of ethical decision making. The two studies outlined in this paper assess the effectiveness of an online module in increasing academic integrity among first semester engineering students. Study 1 tested the effectiveness of an academic honesty tutorial by using a between groups design with a (...) Time 1- and Time 2-test. An academic honesty quiz assessed participants’ knowledge at both time points. Study 2, which incorporated an improved version of the module and quiz, utilized a between groups design with three assessment time points. The additional Time 3-test allowed researchers to test for retention of information. Results were analyzed using ANCOVA and t tests. In Study 1, the experimental group exhibited significant improvement on the plagiarism items, but not the total score. However, at Time 2 there was no significant difference between groups after controlling for Time 1 scores. In Study 2, between- and within-group analyses suggest there was a significant improvement in total scores, but not plagiarism scores, after exposure to the tutorial. Overall, the academic integrity module impacted participants as evidenced by changes in total score and on specific plagiarism items. Although future implementation of the tutorial and quiz would benefit from modifications to reduce ceiling effects and improve assessment of knowledge, the results suggest such tutorial may be one valuable element in a systems approach to improving the academic integrity of engineering students. (shrink)

First published in 1903, this volume revolutionized philosophy and forever altered the direction of ethical studies. A philosopher’s philosopher, G. E. Moore was the idol of the Bloomsbury group, and Lytton Strachey declared that Principia Ethica marked the rebirth of the Age of Reason. This work clarifies some of moral philosophy’s most common confusions and redefines the science’s terminology. Six chapters explore: the subject matter of ethics, naturalistic ethics, hedonism, metaphysical ethics, ethics in relation to conduct, and the ideal. Moore's (...) simplicity of style and precise use of everyday language exercised an enormous influence on the development of analytic philosophy, and they contribute to the continuing resonance of his compelling arguments. (shrink)

Researchers have evaluated how broad categories of emotion influence judgments of learning relative to neutral items. Specifically, JOLs are typically higher for emotional relative to neutral items. The novel goal of the present research was to evaluate JOLs for fine-grained categories of emotion. Participants studied faces with afraid, angry, sad, or neutral expressions and with afraid, angry, or sad expressions. Participants identified the expressed emotion, made a JOL for each, and completed a recognition test. JOLs were higher for the emotional (...) relative to neutral expressions. However, JOLs were insensitive to the categories of negative emotion. Using a survey design in Experiment 3, participants demonstrated idiosyncratic beliefs about emotion. Some people believed the fine-grained emotions were equally memorable, whereas others believed a specific emotion was most memorable. Thus, beliefs about emotion are nuanced, which has important implications for JOL theory. (shrink)

A growing body of research has examined how people judge the persistence of identity over time—that is, how they decide that a particular individual is the same entity from one time to the next. While a great deal of progress has been made in understanding the types of features that people typically consider when making such judgments, to date, existing work has not explored how these judgments may be shaped by normative considerations. The present studies demonstrate that normative beliefs do (...) appear to play an important role in people's beliefs about persistence. Specifically, people are more likely to judge that the identity of a given entity remains the same when its features improve than when its features deteriorate. Study 1 provides a basic demonstration of this effect. Study 2 shows that this effect is moderated by individual differences in normative beliefs. Study 3 examines the underlying mechanism, which is the belief that, in general, various entities are essentially good. Study 4 directly manipulates beliefs about essence to show that the positivity bias regarding essences is causally responsible for the effect. (shrink)

Mitchell et al. contend that there is no need to posit a contribution based on the formation of associative links to human learning. In order to sustain this argument, they have ignored evidence which is difficult to explain with propositional accounts; and they have mischaracterised the evidence they do cite by neglecting features of these experiments that contradict a propositional account.

In a legendary technical report, the Google founders sketched a wisdom-of-crowds justification for PageRank arguing that the algorithm, by aggregating incoming links to webpages in a sophisticated way, tracks importance on the web. On this reading of the report, webpages that have a high impact as measured by PageRank are supposed to be important webpages in a sense of importance that is not reducible to mere impact or popularity. In this paper, we look at the state of the art regarding (...) the more precise statement of the thesis that PageRank and other similar in-link-based ranking algorithms can be justified by reference to the wisdom of crowds. We argue that neither the influential preferential attachment models due to Barabási and Albert in nor the recent model introduced by Masterton et al. in allows for a satisfactory wisdom-of-crowds justification of PageRank. As a remedy, we suggest that future work should explore “dual models” of linking on the web, i.e., models that combine the two previous approaches. Dual models view links as being attracted to both popularity and importance. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest serve as a cipher for a radical rupture in the Flexnerian paradigm of medicine, and they can only be addressed if we recognize that health care is now practiced by institutions, not just individual physicians. By showing how "appropriate utilization of services" or "that which is medically indicated" is a function of socioeconomic factors related to institutional responsibilities, I point toward an administrative and organizational ethic as a needed component for addressing conflicts of interest. The argument is (...) developed by reviewing three important books. First, I consider Mark Rodwin's attempt to configure the economic structures of medicine so that classical fiduciary and scientific ideals can be fostered. Second, I consider E. Haavi Morreim's attempt to modify the classical ideals in order to account for new economic realities. Finally, by considering essays in a recent volume on conflicts of interest edited by Spece, Shimm, and Buchanan, I argue for a constructive dialectic between the approaches of Rodwin and Morreim. In order to properly address conflicts of interest, there must be a radical reassessment of medicine that accounts for the interrelation between scientific, ethical, and economic concerns. Until institutions come into view and professional ethics is developed to account for their role, legitimate interests and obligations of diverse parties cannot be harmonized. (shrink)

Em Totalidade e Infinito, Lévinas descreve cuidadosamente a separação do Mesmo e do Outro, recorrendo diversas vezes ao termo “ensinamento” para definir o acolhimento num Eu interior, daquilo que lhe é exterior. Mas para Lévinas, na absoluta alteridade, o outro é Outrem, outra pessoa, irredutível à minha posse, exterioridade absoluta que me encara a partir de um rosto, como um ser que me fala e, por isso, é o único capaz de me ensinar. Acolher outrem, nesse sentido, é responder-lhe e, (...) assim, ser responsável por ele, numa relação que é, essencialmente, ética. Com isso em mente, é possível refletir sobre o sentido mais profundo da relação educativa que, para além dos papéis que assumem professores e alunos numa totalidade sistemática, Eu e Outro constituem uma frente a frente que dá sentido ao mundo do qual vivem, se apropriam e compartilham. A relação entre os sujeitos na educação, portanto, extrai sua significação do ensinamento, não como prioridade de um conteúdo comunicável, mas como responsabilidade infinita por outrem, como relação ética. (shrink)

_The Collision of Science with the Question of Be-ing in Heidegger’s Thinking_ Science does not lead to the full, final, truly in-depth exploration of beings; it leaves unresolved (unclarified) the understanding of being; it does not think through the question of being, of the “to be”, of the “is”; it does not think being as such; it adopts a metaphysical idea of being as being of beings (as one, the highest of beings). As this study shows, being is not within (...) the range of merely scientific investigation. Many philosophical questions (e. g., the foundation of the sciences; the understanding of the ontological difference) go beyond and transcend the reach of scientific inquiry. The collision of science with the question of being, with the question of the “to be”, comes from science attempting to move beyond its intrinsic limitations and boundary. According to Heidegger’s be-ing-historical thinking, scientific inquiry cannot resolve the question of the “to be” and that of the truth of the “to be”; it cannot eliminate (suppress) these distinctly philosophical concerns. Science cannot become a substitute for philosophy. As this study indicates, the understanding of the danger of the “collision” identified contributes to its prevention and to a creative interaction between science and philosophy. (shrink)

Previous research shows that people can use the co-occurrence of words and objects in ambiguous situations (i.e., containing multiple words and objects) to learn word meanings during a brief passive training period (Yu & Smith, 2007). However, learners in the world are not completely passive but can affect how their environment is structured by moving their heads, eyes, and even objects. These actions can indicate attention to a language teacher, who may then be more likely to name the attended objects. (...) Using a novel active learning paradigm in which learners choose which four objects they would like to see named on each successive trial, this study asks whether active learning is superior to passive learning in a cross-situational word learning context. Finding that learners perform better in active learning, we investigate the strategies and discover that most learners use immediate repetition to disambiguate pairings. Unexpectedly, we find that learners who repeat only one pair per trial—an easy way to infer this pair—perform worse than those who repeat multiple pairs per trial. Using a working memory extension to an associative model of word learning with uncertainty and familiarity biases, we investigate individual differences that correlate with these assorted strategies. (shrink)

The obstacle to more objective knowledge of early Pythagoreanism is the ideological conflict over the proper mission of historiography. Not only the confusing evidence, but also the different investigative procedures and theories of history employed, make solving the Pythagorean problem difficult. I analyze the historiographic methodologies of some modern historians of Pythagoreanism in respect to the kinds of historical explanation they provide. Immediately ideological controversy arises between idealist and materialist historians. ;My critical evaluation proceeds from two theses. The content of (...) ideas reflects their social referents. Consequently, one must identify the class interests of early Pythagoreans. Writing history is a contemporary undertaking by which historians reflect their own social interests. Therefore, historiographic methodology continually must be objectified to overcome the subjectivism of historical relativism. ;I review the reconstructions of six historians. John Burnet, an empiricist, held that the Greeks entirely broke from their religious past to develop philosophy. F. M. Cornford, a Durkheimian, used anthropology to reveal philosophy's totemic content. J. E. Raven is a philologist; he maintaned that ancient philosophy was the Eleatic-Pythagorean debate. W. K. C. Guthrie, an eclectic, held that science served Pythagorean religious interests. These idealist historians attributed the Greek achievement to absolutized temperaments or racial factors; the development of ideas is not mediated by practical necessity. George Thomson and Alban Winspear are historical materialists. They explained ancient philosophy by showing the class interests of philosophers in a mercantile economy based on slave labor. ;After introducing the Pythagorean problem, I present, by chapter, first an exposition of each historian's account of the causes of Greek philosophy and then his exposition of early Pythagoreanism. My analyses follow each section. In the first part of the final chapter I discuss each historian in the context of the ideological controversy. In the second part I present a general outline of procedure for scientific historiography. (shrink)

We study ideals in the computably enumerable Turing degrees, and their upper bounds. Every proper ideal in the c.e. Turing degrees has an incomplete upper bound. It follows that there is no prime ideal in the c.e. Turing degrees. This answers a question of Calhoun [2]. Every proper ideal in the c.e. Turing degrees has a low2 upper bound. Furthermore, the partial order of ideals under inclusion is dense.

The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...) possession: this tie is a consequence of what, by definition, it is to possess (i.e., to understand) one’s concepts. A corollary of the overall account is that the a priori disciplines (logic, mathematics, philosophy) can be largely autonomous from the empirical sciences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:98 COMMENTS ON TWEYMAN AND DAVIS Tweyman contends that in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues Philo sets aside his Pyrrhonian or skeptical approach to theology, which consists in falsifying or casting doubt on the hypotheses of Cleanthes, and instead argues for a thesis of his own, viz. what we might call the "indifference thesis" that the original source of all things is morally indifferent. Davis counters with (...) an alternative interpretation of these two Parts of the Dialogues, arguing that Philo's approach to Cleanthes' arguments is consistent throughout the Dialogues and that Philo's aim is always the same, viz., to show that if cleanthes remains true to his principles and accepts their logical consequences, it is Cleanthes who is the Pyrrhonian and Philo who is the moderate skeptic. My position is that neither Tweyman nor Davis have given a proper analysis of Parts X and XI. I would agree with Davis that Tweyman' s position does seem to have an initial implausibility to it for at least two reasons. First of all, in Part II Philo commits himself to the "mystical incomprehensibility thesis" that the attributes of God are perfect but incomprehensible; and the mystical incomprehensibility thesis is incompatible with the indifference thesis. It cannot be the case both that God has perfect but incomprehensible attributes and that we also know he is morally indifferent. Moreover, the mystical incomprehensi2 bility thesis is reiterated in Part VI and more importantly, in Part X: "None but we mystics, as you were pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible" 99 (D 199). Since Philo appears to stick to the mystical incomprehensibility thesis, Tweyman has a problem explaining how Philo can hold one position on the attributes of God in Part X (the mystical incomprehensibility thesis) and then supposedly reverse himself in Part XI to argue for another (the indifference thesis). Second, Tweyman' s position seems to contradict the strategic position outlined by Philo in Part II: "You seem not to apprehend, replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way; and by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion." (D 145) The strategy is to show Cleanthes that any position but that of the mystics has dangerous, i.e., skeptical or theologically unwelcome consequences, and so should be abandoned. Philo's strategy is not to defend his own position, but rather to reveal the weaknesses in Cleanthes' position. Thus far I would agree that Davis' interpretation is more consistent with both Philo's strategic position and with his mystical incomprehensibility thesis. Yet Davis does not directly take up the important point about Parts X and XI which Tweyman raises: that Philo changes his way of arguing in Parts X and XI from that which he had been employing previously in the first eight sections, i.e., that he changes from a Pyrrhonian to a non-Pyrrhonian way of arguing. This is how Tweyman puts it: In the first eight sections, Philo argues against Cleanthes' hypothesis by advancing his own hypotheses. His effort to advance hypotheses must be assessed in light of the fact that (by his own admission) all such hypotheses are based on insufficient 100 data, and, therefore, none is, strictly speaking, acceptable. Their use is not to establish truths about the nature of God, but to establish the conclusion which we find at the end of Part VIII that 'a total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource.' The design of the world is compatible with, and could have arisen from, an indefinite number of designing principles. On the other hand, we have seen that in dealing with Cleanthes' hypotheses in Parts X and XI we are able to proceed more scientifically, and, in this manner, eliminate all but one of the hypotheses which can be introduced to explain the design of the world. (Tweyman 84-85) Now Tweyman does seem to have a point here. It is true that Philo takes his arguments in Parts X and XI to have a conclusiveness which he did not attribute to his... (shrink)

In The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl expands his philosophical horizon to include the question about the genuine meaning of human existence. Understanding the crisis of the European sciences as a symptom of the crisis of European philosophy and as an expression of the life-crisis of European humanity, and interpreting European science, philosophy, and humanity as representative of their global-historical counterparts, Husserl argues that the life-crisis of European humanity is reflective of the critical condition of global-historical (...) humanity. The crisis of “European” life emerges as a crisis of human existence, and Husserl’s phenomenology unfolds as a search for an answer to the question not only about the sense of the life-world but also about the meaning of human life. Thus phenomenology, as care for humanity, shares with existentialism, as a humanism in the broadest sense, the conviction that human beings live in a world not in which life makes sense, but in which they must make sense of life. Accordingly, the genuine essence of human existence is not passively “given” but actively “taken,” since it involves an entelechy that constitutes itself in an evolutionary achievement, and it is the evidentiary result of an existential struggle for meaning against annihilating forms of meaninglessness, namely, irrationalism, positivism, and skepticism. This paper examines Husserl’s hermeneutical-historical approach to the question about the meaning of human existence and suggests an understanding of phenomenology as a form of humanism, and perhaps even as a unique kind of “existentialism,” that is, an ethical philosophy that takes absolute moral responsibility for the presuppositionless application of reason to life.En La crisis e las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental, Husserl expande su horizonte filosófico a fin de incluir en él la pregunta por el auténtico sentido de la existencia humana. Al entender la crisis de las ciencias europeas como un síntoma de la crisis de la filosofía europea y como una expresión de la crisis vital de la humanidad europea, y al interpretar la ciencia, la filosofía y la humanidad europeas como representativas de sus contrapartes históricas y globales, Husserl argumenta que la crisis vital de la humanidad europea refleja la condición crítica en que se encuentra la humanidad en perspectiva histórica global. La crisis de la vida “europea” emerge como una crisis de la existencia humana, y la fenomenología de Husserl se despliega como la búsqueda de una respuesta a la cuestión no sólo del sentido del mundo de la vida, sino también del significado de la vida humana. La fe-nomenología, como cuidado de la humanidad, comparte con el existencialismo, entendido como un humanismo en el sentido más amplio, la convicción de que los seres humanos viven en un mundo en el cual no es que la vida tenga sentido sino que ellos deben dar sentido a la vida. En consonancia, la auténtica esencia de la existencia humana no está pasivamente “dada” sino que es activamente “tomada”, ya que ella envuelve una entelequia que se constituye en una realización evolutiva, y que es el resultado evidenciador de un combate existencial por el significado contra las formas de sinsentido que son aniquiladoras, a saber: irracionalismo, positivismo y escepticismo. Este ensayo examina la aproximación histórico-hermenéutica de Husserl a la cuestión del significado de la existencia humana, y sugiere una comprensión de la fenomenología como una forma de humanismo, y quizá incluso como un tipo único de existencialismo; esto es, como una filosofía ética que asume una responsabilidad moral absoluta en la aplicación sin presupuestos de la razón a la vida. (shrink)

We study the classes of hypersimple and semicomputable sets as well as their intersection in the weak truth table degrees. We construct degrees that are not bounded by hypersimple degrees outside any non-trivial upper cone of Turing degrees and show that the hypersimple-free c.e. wtt degrees are downwards dense in the c.e. wtt degrees. We also show that there is no maximal (w.r.t. ≤wtt) hypersimple wtt degree. Moreover, we consider the sets that are both hypersimple and semicomputable, characterize them as (...) the (bi-infinite) c.e. cuts of computable orderings of ℕ of order type ω+ω* and study their wtt degrees. We show that there are hypersimple degrees that are not bounded by any hypersimple semicomputable degree, investigate relationships with the join and look for maximal and minimal elements of related classes. (shrink)

Identity Economics provides an important and compelling new way to understand human behavior, revealing how our identities--and not just economic incentives--influence our decisions. In 1995, economist Rachel Kranton wrote future Nobel Prize-winner George Akerlof a letter insisting that his most recent paper was wrong. Identity, she argued, was the missing element that would help to explain why people--facing the same economic circumstances--would make different choices. This was the beginning of a fourteen-year collaboration--and of Identity Economics. The authors explain how (...) our conception of who we are and who we want to be may shape our economic lives more than any other factor, affecting how hard we work, and how we learn, spend, and save. Identity economics is a new way to understand people's decisions--at work, at school, and at home. With it, we can better appreciate why incentives like stock options work or don't; why some schools succeed and others don't; why some cities and towns don't invest in their futures--and much, much more. Identity Economics bridges a critical gap in the social sciences. It brings identity and norms to economics. People's notions of what is proper, and what is forbidden, and for whom, are fundamental to how hard they work, and how they learn, spend, and save. Thus people's identity--their conception of who they are, and of who they choose to be--may be the most important factor affecting their economic lives. And the limits placed by society on people's identity can also be crucial determinants of their economic well-being. (shrink)

This article presents a new criticisms of reductive approaches to knowledge-‘wh’ (i.e., those approaches on which whether one stands in the knowledge-‘wh’ relation to a question is determined by whether one stands in the knowledge-‘that’ relation to some answer(s) to the question). It argues in particular that the truth of a knowledge-‘wh’ attribution like ‘Janna knows where she can buy an Italian newspaper’ depends not only on what Janna knows about the availability of Italian newspapers, but on what she believes (...) about the matter. This dependence of Janna's knowledge-‘wh’ on her (possibly false) beliefs is incompatible with the reductive approach. (shrink)

Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9. Consciousness: Owen Flanagan. 10. Decision Making: J. Frank (...) Yates and Paul A. Estin. 11. Emotions: Paul E. Griffiths. 12. Imagery and Spatial Representation: Rita E. Anderson. 13. Language Evolution and Neuromechanisms: Terrence W. Deacon. 14. Language Processing: Kathryn Bock and Susan M. Garnsey. 15. Linguistics Theory: D. Terence Langendoen. 16. Machine Learning: Paul Thagard. 17. Memory: Henry L. Roediger III and Lyn M. Goff. 18. Perception: Cees Van Leeuwen. 19. Perception: Color: Austen Clark. 20. Problem Solving: Kevin Dunbar. 21. Reasoning: Lance J. Rips. 22. Social Cognition: Alan J. Lambert and Alison L. Chasteen. 23. Unconscious Intelligence: Rhianon Allen and Arthur S. Reber. 24. Understanding Texts: Art Graesser and Pam Tipping. 25. Word Meaning: Barbara C. Malt. Part III: Methodologies of Cognitive Science:. 26. Artificial Intelligence: Ron Sun. 27. Behavioral Experimentation: Alexander Pollatsek and Keith Rayner. 28. Cognitive Ethology: Marc Bekoff. 29. Deficits and Pathologies: Christopher D. Frith. 30. Ethnomethodology: Barry Saferstein. 31. Functional Analysis: Brian Macwhinney. 32. Neuroimaging: Randy L. Buckner and Steven E. Petersen. 33. Protocal Analysis: K. Anders Ericsson. 34. Single Neuron Electrophysiology: B. E. Stein, M.T. Wallace, and T.R. Stanford. 35. Structural Analysis: Robert Frank. Part IV: Stances in Cognitive Science:. 36. Case-based Reasoning: David B. Leake. 37. Cognitive Linguistics: Michael Tomasello. 38. Connectionism, Artificial Life, and Dynamical Systems: Jeffrey L. Elman. 39. Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition: Andy Clark. 40. Mediated Action: James V. Wertsch. 41. Neurobiological Modeling: P. Read Montague and Peter Dayan. 42. Production Systems: Christian D. Schunn and David Klahr. Part V: Controversies in Cognitive Science:. 43. The Binding Problem: Valerie Gray Hardcastle. 44. Heuristics and Satisficing: Robert C. Richardson. 45. Innate Knowledge: Barbara Landau. 46. Innateness and Emergentism: Elizabeth Bates, Jeffrey L. Elman, Mark H. Johnson, Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Domenico Parisi, and Kim Plunkett. 47. Intentionality: Gilbert Harman. 48. Levels of Explanation and Cognition Architectures: Robert N. McCauley. 49. Modularity: Irene Appelbaum. 50. Representation and Computation: Robert S. Stufflebeam. 51. Representations: Dorrit Billman. 52. Rules: Terence Horgan and John Tienson. 53. Stage Theories Refuted: Donald G. Mackay. Part VI: Cognitive Science in the Real World:. 54. Education: John T. Bruer. 55. Ethics: Mark L. Johnson. 56. Everyday Life Environments: Alex Kirlik. 57. Institutions and Economics: Douglass C. North. 58. Legal Reasoning: Edwina L. Rissland. 59. Mental Retardation: Norman W. Bray, Kevin D. Reilly, Lisa F. Huffman, Lisa A. Grupe, Mark F. Villa, Kathryn L. Fletcher, and Vivek Anumolu. 60. Science: William F. Brewer and Punyashloke Mishra. Selective Biographies of Major Contributors to Cognitive Science: William Bechtel and Tadeusz Zawidzki. (shrink)

While a number of empirical studies have appeared on impaired self-awareness (ISA) after traumatic brain injury (TBI) over the last 20 years, the relative role of denial (as a psychological method of coping) has typically not been addressed in these studies. We propose that this failure has limited our understanding of how ISA and denial differentially affect efforts to rehabilitate persons with TBI. In this selective review paper, we summarize early findings in the field and integrate those findings with more (...) recent observations (i.e., 1999–2019). We believe that this synthesis of information and expert clinical opinion will inform future research on ISA and denial as well as approaches to rehabilitation for persons with TBI. (shrink)

George Karamanolis breaks new ground in the study of later ancient philosophy by examining the interplay of the two main schools of thought, Platonism and Aristotelianism, from the first century BC to the third century AD. Arguing against prevailing scholarly assumption, he argues that the Platonists turned to Aristotle only in order to elucidate Plato's doctrines and to reconstruct Plato's philosophy, and that they did not hesitate to criticize Aristotle when judging him to be at odds with Plato. Karamanolis (...) offers much food for thought to ancient philosophers and classicists. (shrink)

Two contradictions are in contradiction. One is tragic, or insurmountable, contradiction: two equally founded demands oppose each other without any possibility of reconciliation (e.g., Antigone's conflict). The other is dialectical contradiction, which guarantees its own overcoming. Hegel's use of the German word Aufhebung, which means both preservation and suppression, is well known. Translators have proposed equivalents such as “replacement” or “sublimation.” I would suggest incorporation, indeed, digestion. Such a translation is not without consequences because it prompts one to think that (...) even if the dialectic has a strong stomach, its functioning is not free of aftereffects: one has to wonder if there is such a thing as dialectical waste. (shrink)

G. E. Moore was one of the most interesting and influential philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century. This selection of his writings makes the best of his work once again available, and also includes previously unpublished writings. Moore's first published writings, represented in this collection by his papers "The Nature of Judgment" and "The Refutation of Idealism," contributed decisively to the break with idealism which led to the development of analytic philosophy. Moore went on to develop his (...) own style, which combined a defense of the common sense view of the world with a controversial analysis of the content of this view. Also included is Moore's famous "Proof of an External World," which marked a return late in his career to the critique of idealism. Other papers address perception and important issues in logical theory. The collection ends with three new pieces which illustrate Moore's relationship with Wittgenstein. In these pieces Moore discusses his "paradox" whichso fascinated Wittgenstein; the nature of our knowledge of our own sensations; and Malcolm's views about doubt and knowledge which were themselves inspired by Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Intimate relationships such as love and friendship involve familiar patterns of vulnerability. Loving someone renders one susceptible to distress and sorrow when the beloved is harmed and when the loving relationship is impaired. The distinctive kind of vulnerability bound up with intimate relationships also presents an opportunity for wrongful exploitation: for one participant to unfairly use, take advantage of, the other. In the case of commercial exploitation (e.g., exploitation of sweatshop workers), the remedy typically involves either preventing those in the (...) relevant positions of power from taking advantage of the vulnerability of the powerless or removing the vulnerabilities of those in the relevant positions of powerlessness. I argue there are there limits to the application of these two strategies in the intimate relationship context, and I consider what (if anything) might guard against the possibility of exploitation in intimate relationships. (shrink)

The notion of an ℐ -matrix as a model of a given π -institution ℐ is introduced. The main difference from the approach followed so far in CategoricalAlgebraic Logic and the one adopted here is that an ℐ -matrix is considered modulo the entire class of morphisms from the underlying N -algebraic system of ℐ into its own underlying algebraic system, rather than modulo a single fixed -logical morphism. The motivation for introducing ℐ -matrices comes from a desire to formulate (...) a correspondence property for N -protoalgebraic π -institutions closer in spirit to the one for sentential logics than that considered in CAAL before. As a result, in the previously established hierarchy of syntactically protoalgebraic π -institutions, i. e., those with an implication system, and of protoalgebraic π -institutions, i. e., those with a monotone Leibniz operator, the present paper interjects the class of those π -institutions with the correspondence property, as applied to ℐ -matrices. Moreover, this work on ℐ -matrices enables us to prove many results pertaining to the local deduction-detachment theorems, paralleling classical results in Abstract Algebraic Logic formulated, first, by Czelakowski and Blok and Pigozzi. Those results will appear in a sequel to this paper. (shrink)

We show that there is a strong minimal pair in the computably enumerable Turing degrees, i.e. a pair of nonzero c.e. degrees a and b such that a∩b = 0 and for any nonzero c.e. degree x ≤ a, b ∪ x ≥ a.

In the _New Theory of Vision, Berkeley defends the heterogeneity thesis, i.e., the view that the ideas of sight and touch are numerically and specifically distinct. In sections 121-122 of that work, he suggests that the thesis of abstract ideas is somehow closely connected to the heterogeneity thesis, though he does not there fully explain just what the connection is supposed to be. In this paper an interpretation of this connection is proposed and defended. Berkeley needs to reject abstract ideas (...) because, if there were such ideas then the heterogeneity thesis would be false and, in turn, this would lead directly to the falsity of Berkeley's theory of vision. (shrink)

Os dois ensaios aqui traduzidos: “Uma visita a uma glândula pineal”, publicado originalmente em 21 de abril de 1713 no número 35 do Guardian e a “A glândula pineal (continuação)”, publicado no dia 25 de abril, no número 39, formam uma unidade não apenas pela referência a ideia de glândula pineal concebida por Descartes como ponto de interação entre a alma e o corpo, mas também pela forma literária e pelo pseudônimo comum. Eles fazem parte de um conjunto de quatorze (...) ensaios atribuídos a George Berkeley, reunidos e publicados pela primeira vez apenas em 1871, no volume III da edição organizada por A. C. Fraser. Os ensaios publicados no Guardian foram escritos durante a permanência de Berkeley em Londres em 1713, quando Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) e Richard Steele (1672-1729), seus conterrâneos, contribuiriam para lhe abrir caminho no ambiente literário inglês. O principal objetivo de Berkeley ao publicar os ensaios foi o de defender o teísmo cristão contra os “livre-pensadores” da época, assumidos como materialistas e ateus. A tradução aqui apresentada foi realizada com base na edição organizada por Luce e Jessop. The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne. Luce, A. A. and Jessop, T. E. London and Edimburgh: Nelson, 1948, v. 7, 185-192. (shrink)

In their new indictments of global neoliberalism and the economic profession's culpability in its harms, Dani Rodrik and Joseph Stiglitz press the case for reconstructed globalization that generates benefits for all and not just for corporate and financial elites. Both books are deeply consistent with the insights of Karl Polanyi, who had identified the inherent contradictions of the project to create what he called a self-regulating economy. Like Polanyi, Rodrik and Stiglitz are attentive to the inadequacies of neoliberalism, and both (...) emphasize the capture of the state and international economic policy by elites, who have turned their backs on those left behind. While Stiglitz emphasizes that the profession knows how to fix the problem by applying modern Keynesian insights, Rodrik emphasizes the inherent epistemic limitations facing economists. Indeed, his arguments about development policy reflect the insights of Friedrich Hayek into the limits of economic expertise. (shrink)

Berkeley's metaphysical grammar, by C. M. Turbayne.--Berkeley's argument from nomalism, by W. H. Hay.--Berkeley's alleged solipsism, by R. J. Van Iten.--The refutation of idealism, by G. E. Moore.--The refutation of realism, by W. T. Stace.--Berkeley and pyrrhonism, by R. H. Popkin.--A note on Berkeley as precursor of Mach and Einstein, by K. R. Popper.--Berkeley's two concepts of mind, by C. M. Turbayne.--Theoretical terms, Berkeleian notions, and minds, by J. W. Cornman.--Does Berkeley have an ethical theory? by P. J. Olscamp.--The place (...) of God in Berkeley's philosophy, by J. D. Mabbott. (shrink)